FIGHTER jets roar overhead, spitting out decoy flares. Helicopters clatter past, bearing commandos rappelling down ropes. Warships lurk in the waters beyond. All week the crowds on the beaches of Visakhapatnam, a coastal Indian city, have been thrilled by the dress rehearsal for the Indian navy’s great martial show: the International Fleet Review between February 4th and 8th. The extravaganza will draw ships from more than 50 countries.
The last review took place 15 years ago in Mumbai, on the west coast. This time it is being held on the east side—a signal to another rising naval power in that direction: China. India wants to show that in the Indian Ocean, it is supreme. Still, for the sake of good-neighbourliness, China has agreed to participate in the review.
Many will be looking out for one vessel in particular: the INS Arihant, India’s first nuclear-powered submarine armed with ballistic missiles (SSBN, in military jargon). The 6,000-tonne boat will provide India with the third leg of its nuclear “triad”—it already has land- and air-launched nukes. But in doing so, it will also risk accelerating a nuclear arms race in Asia (see chart).
Arihant has been undergoing sea-trials and weapons tests. Naval chiefs had hoped formally to commission it during the review. But as The Economist went to press, it was not clear whether this would happen. The SSBN programme has suffered delays. Indian submarines have been plagued by accidents.
India believes SSBNs are a vital part of its nuclear strategy, which forswears the first use of nuclear weapons. The Indian navy’s latest statement of maritime strategy, published in October, says the country’s nuclear-deterrence doctrine involves having a “credible minimum deterrent” that can deliver “massive nuclear retaliation designed to inflict unacceptable damage” in response to a nuclear strike against India. Because they can readily avoid detection, SSBNs can survive a surprise attack and thus ensure India’s ability to launch a retaliatory “second strike”.
Some nuclear theorists argue that submarine-based deterrents promote peace by making the other side more frightened to attack first. But the extension of the nuclear arms race to Asia’s seas may still have worrying implications—all the more if North Korea gets in on the act. It appears determined to find a way of sticking nuclear warheads on the end of its erratic missile.
China is ahead of the game. It has a fleet of four second-generation Jin-class SSBNs and is testing JL-2 missiles to install in them. These weapons have a range of 7,400km (4,600 miles)—too short, for now, to reach the American mainland from the relative safety of the South China Sea. Pakistan, for its part, is in the early stages of a lower-cost approach. This involves arming diesel-powered subs with nuclear-armed cruise missiles with a range of 700km.
A report for the Lowy Institute, an Australian think-tank, predicts “a long phase of initial instability” as China and India start deploying nuclear missiles on submarines without adequate training or well-developed systems for communicating with them. It says the build-up may aggravate maritime tensions, as China and India seek to dominate local waters in an effort to turn them into havens for their SSBNs. And the submarines may not even provide the security the two countries are looking for. The institute says the Chinese and Indian submarines are noisy. This makes them easier to detect.
A more immediate worry to India is Pakistan’s development and deployment of smaller “tactical” nuclear weapons for use on the battlefield. These may make it more likely that any war between India and Pakistan will go nuclear. They also increase the risk of Pakistan’s weapons being used accidentally—or falling into the hands of extremists (such weapons are under the control of lower-level commanders whose professionalism and loyalty may be dubious). Pakistan says tactical nukes are needed because of an Indian doctrine known as “cold start”. Though never formally adopted, “cold start” foresees Indian units being ready to respond to Pakistani provocation (eg, a terrorist outrage) with little or no notice, by seizing parts of Pakistani territory to use as a bargaining chip.
India says it will not develop battlefield nukes of its own. Instead, it will rely on the threat of massive retaliation against any use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan. Still, it may be another decade before India has a fully-fledged sea-based deterrent. Arihant’s Russian nuclear-power generator is unsuited to long patrols. Initially, the sub is due to be armed with the K-15 missile, with a range of 750km—not enough to reach big cities in northern Pakistan. Striking Chinese ones would be harder still. From the beaches of Visakhapatnam the world will witness not only India’s ambition, but also the many gaps it has yet to fill in order to achieve it.