by Prakash Nanda
Whether it is a coincidence or not, while watching the pre-noon live proceedings of our Parliament today (February 26), I saw opposition members asking the government why not it should consider the demilitarisation proposal of Siachen glacier, something that Pakistan has also been in favour. Obviously, our honourable parliamentarians were worried over the recent tragedy that occurred in the glacier where an avalanche hurtled down and swallowed one of our military posts, resulting in unfortunate demise of ten of our brave soldiers.
Of course, demilitarisation of Siachen has been one of the proposed confidence building measures (CBM) between India and Pakistan for years. It is said that but for some last minute huddles, late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi would have signed an agreement to this effect with his then Pakistani counterpart Benazir Bhutto in 1989. Another late Prime Minister IK Gujral and former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh were reportedly in favour of a similar deal with Pakistan. But if they could not do that, it was essentially because of the strong protests from the Indian Army. Of course this time, the Army has a much more sympathetic government led by Narendra Modi. So any withdrawal, as suggested by the opposition parliamentarians, seems highly unlikely.
Let it be noted that it is a myth that Pakistani soldiers are present in Siachen glacier as such. The glacier is under total control of the Indian soldiers. Pakistanis are behind the Soltoro Ridge, much below the heights of the glacier. But then Pakistan has been publicly arguing over the last 10 years or so that it would “not occupy” the Siachen glacier (the highest and the coldest battle field of the world) if India vacated it.
A historical perspective will do well to understand the issue. Nearly 32 years have passed since India and Pakistan engaged in Siachen on what is called the world’s most absurd war. It all started in 1984 when India launched "Operation Meghdoot" to drive away the “Pakistani incursions”. At the moment, India is in a commanding position in the glacier, which is a part of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. It may be noted that in Jammu and Kashmir India and Pakistan are separated by the so-called Line of Control (LoC), which clearly runs from Sabha in the South to "point NJ9842" in North. This LoC was demarcated under the 1972 Simla agreement. But disagreements remain over whether the line after the point NJ9842 travels northwards to include the entire Siachen region within India, or whether it travels northwestwards to give Pakistan access to the area.
Under the CBM-building talks that began in 2004, India was willing to drawback of forces to the positions prior to the 1972 Shimla Agreement. However, it was insisting on making the present Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL), the line that is demarcating the effective controls of both the sides, a permanent border between India and the planned “disengagement zone”. On its part, Pakistan is arguing that the borders should be re-drawn as per the Simla Agreement, which it claims India violated by launching its “invasion” in 1984. In reality, however, Pakistan is loath to authenticate the AGPL since it would mean admitting it lost the Saltoro ridge and the Quaid Post (named after the founder of Pakistan), now renamed Bana Post by India after Param Vir Chakra winner Subedar Bana Singh who captured it.
Pakistan is ready to withdraw troops only if India drops its insistence on the authentication of current positions being held by Pakistani and Indian troops”. It is against this background that the importance of what Pakistani Ambassador Shaid Malik had told the media on February 9 2007 assumes great significance. The Pakistani envoy said that while it would not be possible for Pakistani to formally authenticate the AGPL, its alternative suggestion would go a long way in meeting the Indian position. “Since we are talking of gradual withdrawal of armed forces from the region, while chalking out the exact withdrawal plan in phases, Pakistan will be recording with India the exact positions of the phased withdrawal. That means when we say that Indian troops will withdraw from point A to point B in the first phase, it should satisfy New Delhi”. What Mr. Malik was trying to say that since the point A, for all practical purposes, would be in what India says AGPL, the exercise was as good as its authentication. This was quite an interesting proposition. Malik revealed that this proposition has been given from Pakistani side to the Indian side. But the then Indian defence minister A K Antony was firm on the authentication.
Should India consider withdrawing from Siachen? The question has many dimensions. Going by the arguments of the peaceniks, the glacier has no strategic value and that there are tremendous economic advantages of the withdrawal, both in terms of greenbacks and human costs. Where a loaf of bread to a soldier costs Rs. 2000, leave alone his special shoes and clothes, an American expert has said that both India and Pakistan are spending each as Rs. Two crore a day to maintain their military positions in the region. And then there are the human casualties. Rising between 18,000 and 22,000 feet above sea level, temperatures in the region can drop to an alarming 60 degrees Celsius below freezing. Total Indian casualties on Siachen since 1984 are estimated to be about 2000, of which nearly all (97% to be precise) of the deaths have been due to a variance of weather related illness, fatigue or injuries. Diplomatically speaking, it is argued that withdrawal from Siachen will do both India and Pakistan a lot of good. It will earn tremendous international goodwill and go a long way in facilitating further the peace-process in Kashmir.
I think all these are overstatements on the part of the peaceniks. As a military power of consequence, money should not be a limiting factor as maintenance of our troops elsewhere in the Himalayan range of comparable heights, which is vital for our military preparedness, will also cost us more or less the same. As defence minister Manohar Parrikar told Parliament on February 26, the average annual casualty figures have come down to 10 from 28, , thanks to technical and infrastructural improvements.
As regards the strategic significance of Siachen, we must know why went there in the first place. As MK Rasgotra, India’s foreign secretary in 1984 and a party to the decision of the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to send troops to Siachen, has written elsewhere, in blatant violation of the Cease-Fire Line (CFL) Agreement of July 1949 ( same as the line of control in 1971) that had stipulated that from point NJ 9842 onwards the line would run “north to the glaciers”, leaving larger part of the Siachen glacier and the region east of it under Indian control, Pakistan was sending scientific expeditions to the area, claiming the whole area as its territory and “Pakistan’s two allies – China and the US — had been publishing maps showing the entire glaciated region up to the Karakorram Pass as territory under Pakistan’s control”.
It was against this background that the Army was “given the order” to move in and prevent the Pakistan army from occupying any part of the Saltoro Ridge. As Rasgotra writes, “Particularly vexing for us was the thought that our two difficult neighbours, already in illegal occupation of large chunks of J&K territory, would link up to surround Central Ladakh on three sides within our own territory. Such a juncture would give them dominance over the Shyok Valley and easy access to Khardung La Pass, and from that vantage point their forces would threaten Leh, a mere half days’ march from the Pass. The myth about Siachen, the adjoining glaciated areas and the Karakorram Pass being of no strategic importance is a recent invention: now that the region is secure, such myth making comes easy. Things looked very different to us when a clear danger loomed on the horizon’.
Besides, Siachen is a part of pre-1948 Jammu and Kashmir which is our integral territory. Thus, our dispute with Pakistan is territorial. In any eventual resolution of territorial disputes, possession of “disputed” territory under one’s control is a great “strategic advantage” during negotiations to strengthen one’s claims. Should we forgo this advantage in Siachen? Our history with Pakistan has been such that surrendering advantages has not brought any desired results. We released 96000 Pakistani prisoners of war after the Shimla Agreement 1972 with the hope that Pakistan would eventually agree to convert the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir to international border. It did not happen. We surrendered Hajipir Pass that we had brought under our control in 1965 war. Had it remained with us, terrorists from Pakistan would have found it very difficult to cross over to our side and cause havoc in Kashmir.
Against this background, withdrawing from Siachen will be a monumental strategic blunder.