by Pradip R Sagar
At a time when the debate over the release of the classified Henderson Brooks report into India’s humiliating military debacle against China in 1962 still continues, Shiv Kunal Verma’s 1962-The War That Wasn’t has exposed the ill-preparedness of the Indian armed forces and decisions taken by the then political leadership.
Verma’s father Major General (retd.) Ashok Kalyan Verma was the Captain with the 2 Rajput, which was completely wiped out in the war. The book is primarily a narration of closed-door meetings in the Raisina Hill and Army Headquarters along with some controversial and heroic incidents that happened in the mountain battlefields.
Based on dozens of interviews with soldiers, support staff, bureaucrats and numerous officers who gave a first-hand account of what happened in 1962, the book also has inside inputs on arguments and discussions between the Jawaharlal Nehru-Krishna Menon political leadership and the then Army Chief K S Thimayya. For instance, Verma writes that for the first time, the normally reticent Thimayya exchanged angry words with the Prime Minister. The Army Chief told Nehru that his arbitrary decision of making North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) the responsibility of the army, made public in Parliament, was preposterous and completely against Indian interests. Thimayya felt that Nehru had completely compromised the army. “Without providing the additional resources required, handing over the borders to the army was a meaningless gesture...” writes Verma.During the clash on the Nam Ka Chu on October 20, 1962, where over 400 Indian soldiers were massacred by soldiers of People’s Liberation Army of China, the Chinese had rather effortlessly pushed the Indian troops back to the south of Tawang Chu. The Chinese high command was fully aware of all the changes that were taking place on the
Indian side as Chinese intelligence agencies had set up a web of agents over the last few years to monitor and report on all Indian activity.
There was enough reason to suspect that the primitive communication set-up of the Indian Army in NEFA was also compromised and not only were the Chinese listening in, but they also wereinserting bogus messages at key moments into the chain of command, which helped further unnerve and confuse the Indian commanders.
While criticising Nehru for his leadership and lack of foresight, Verma writes that Nehru may have been obsessed with his own image as a champion of non-alignment, but militarily that had not stopped him from eventually taking the right steps when needed. “Even though Nehru made some crucial mistakes—going to the UN in 1948 just when a military solution to the problem seemed feasible and then supporting China on the world stage despite it having invaded Tibet—he could not have been unaware about the importance of the country’s defence,” writes Verma.
“The Chinese had the first laugh, as the Indians had so far played the game just as they would have wished them to. Even according to Chinese records, at no stage had there been any action that pitted more than an Indian infantry company against at least four to five times the number of Chinese troops. The Chinese officially admit to 2,419 casualties (722 dead and 1,697 wounded). The figure is quite stunning, given the situation in which each Indian position was asked to fight.”
To add to India’s lasting shame, neither the Prime Minister nor the Indian Army was even aware that the ‘war’ had ended until they read about it in the newspapers—despite the Indian Embassy informed two days earlier.
Describing Nehru walking into the Chinese trap despite all the warning, the game was over before it had even begun. The then Home Minister Sardar Patel died 38 days after writing his famous letter spelling out the Chinese intent, but sadly it was ignored.
“The Chinese played their cards in such a manner that the Indians lost what should have been at best a defensive war by not fighting it at all.” And , finally, to top it all, after the conflict, the Chinese actually managed to convince almost everyone that Nehru was solely responsible for the clash between India and China in 1962.