by Dibyendu Sekhar Kumar
The huge quantities of weapons-grade fissile material in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Uzbekistan and other former Soviet and East European states and unknown amounts of Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium in the possession of Pakistan & North Korea greatly increase the risk of nuclear terror. The nuclear smuggling network set up by the notorious thug A Q Khan and his international cohorts demonstrates the relative use by which nuclear material and technology can be illicitly obtained & dispersed. Pakistan & China are the only two known nuclear capable nations to have openly proliferated fissile materials to rough nations, ironically Pakistan is itself perceived to be a rough nation by many western powers. A Q Khan has admitted that between 1989 and 2003, he had provided Iran, Libya & North Korea with highly sensitive nuclear material & technology originally secured from China for its own nuclear weapons programs.
The ease with which terrorists could build and detonate a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or a "dirty bomb" make this kind of nuclear terrorist attack especially concerning. An RDD is any device that causes the purposeful dissemination of radioactive material without a nuclear detonation. Whereas a nuclear device uses radioactive material to create a nuclear fission or fusion explosion, RDDs use a material’s natural radioactivity as a weapon. A dirty bomb is one type of RDD that uses a conventional explosion to disperse radioactive material over a targeted area.
In Pakistan, new investigations have revealed unauthorized sales of sensitive nuclear technology by nuclear scientists supportive of a fundamentalist Islamic agenda. These developments raise question about the security of that country's nuclear weapons. Alamringly new revelations echo earlier disclosures in 2001 that Pakistani nuclear scientists provided aid of unknown dimensions to al-Qaeda.
It is widely accepted that terrorists have essentially four mechanisms by which they can exploit military and civilian nuclear assets:
1) The theft and detonation of an intact nuclear weapon
2) The theft or purchase of fissile material leading to the fabrication and detonation of a crude nuclear bomb or an improvised nuclear device.
3) Attack and sabotage of nuclear facilities, in particular power plants (recently several Indian Nuclear facilities faced a similar threat from LeT or JeM terrorist groups), causing the release of large amounts of radioactivity.
4) The unauthorized acquisition of nuclear materials contributing to the fabrication and detonation of a radiological disperson device or a "Dirty Bomb" or a Radiation Emission Device.
Ensuring Safeguards: Mitigating Risks
A starting point for developing a comprehensive plan in understanding the nature of nuclear terrorism is to underline the relative risks involved. Risk can be defined as the probability of an event multiplied by its consequences. Experts generally believe that nuclear terror acts with the highest consequencxes are the least likey to occur as they are the most difficult to accomplish. Conversely, those which are least damaging are the most likely to take place because they are the easiest to carry out. Therefore, taking into account both the magnitude of potential effects and the difficulty in execution India must work very rigorously to address them.
Reducing risks requries understanding the chain of events nucessary for a nuclear terror act to occur. In the case of detonation of an intact nuclear weapon or improvized nuclear device risk mitigating framework has to be established & managed to address this precarious issue.
1. Keeping weapons in a disassembled state (with warheads and fissile material kept at separate locations), the use of Permissive Action Link technology to make weapons unusable if stolen, the use of authenticating and enabling codes to impose high-level and centralised control over the weapons and ensuring against unintended or irrational use by unauthorised or armed forces personnel.
2. The use of concentric physical barriers such as high walls, gates, guards and related technologies (such as cameras and motion sensors) which impose security around the environments of nuclear weapons facilities in order to produce a highly visible image of impenetrability will deter those seeking to gain access to the facilities.
3. Reduce vulnerability to a nuclear security incident by systematically denying outsiders opportunities to gain illicit access to nuclear weapons. Consequently, the nuclear establishment is distributed geographically: Materials processing and weapons production facilities are consolidated under tight government control. Special nuclear material is reportedly stored apart from the weapons themselves. Warheads are reportedly stored separately from delivery systems.
4. Another precaution is to maintain strict secrecy over the location of storage sites and to transport and deploy weapons clandestinely rather than in convoys that have a stronger, highly visible security profile. These security precautions produce fewer visible signs of movements, thereby lowering the risks associated with possible theft of or attack on weapons at their most vulnerable point, in transit.
5. On the procedural side set up a Nuclear Strategic Safety Division needs to be in place, the authority and control of the division over those who operate and have roles in the maintenance, transport, deployment, operations, and protection of nuclear weapons and related infrastructure should be maintained through a variety of means. These include robust recruitment and personnel reliability screening to exclude or rotate out of existing duties those thought to be unreliable or potentially subject to outside pressures (for example of blackmail, honey-trap, foreign sympathies, and so forth); the use of intelligence elements to oversee those with operational nuclear weapons duties; the use of other intelligence agencies to vet and monitor those with access to nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons related materials; and the use of the “Multi-Person Rule” meaning that all activities related to nuclear weapons operations must include the decisions and actions of at least two individuals. The latter operates throughout the chain of command from the civil-military composition which should include the Head of State, Senior Ministers and armed forces personnel, and which has overall authority over nuclear weapons, down to the individuals operating a single nuclear weapon.
Conclusion
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the nature of the nuclear threat facing the world has been fundamentally changed. If a nuclear weapon devastates a major city in our lifetime, it will, more likely than not, be detonated by a terrorist group, rather than a national military. However, such a tragedy would not happen without a state being involved in some capacity. At some point, the terrorist perpetrators would have had to steal nuclear assets from a state-run facility, or have those assets given to them from someone within a state’s nuclear complex. As the unfortunate examples of Pakistan and North Korea demonstrate, the probability of this happening is greater than many would care to admit.
Dibyendu Sekhar Kumar is an avid Defence enthusiast and a great Fan of IDN. This piece on Nuclear Safety, Security & Safeguards was written by him exclusively for IDN
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