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PAK SCAN: Indian Arms Buying Spree Unabated

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S-400 is known to be the most Advanced Air Defense Systems of its kind

The Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has mapped out that India needs $233 billion to meet its weapons and equipment requirements in 11 years. This has been calculated according to the Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) for 2012-2027. The Indian weapon purchases are so massive and diversified that it would require several research papers to explain them. The following is only a brief attempt in that direction.

According to reports, from 2004 to 2014, 75 percent of all of New Delhi’s weapons imports came from Russia. This is understandable considering the relationship between the two countries and the kind of weapon systems used by India. 

From 2009 to 2013, India and Russia struck defense deals of around US$30 billion. On the other hand, during the same period, the Indian government signed contracts worth $30 billion with France and $11 billion with the United States. These were besides what the Indian government had signed with Israel and other countries. This means that in only four years, the Indian government had signed contracts more than US$70 billion with only three countries. The figures are staggering.

Again, from 2012-2013 to 2014-2015 fiscal years, 162 arms purchase contracts were signed by India, among them 67 with other countries, including Russia (18 agreements), the United States (13) and France (six). The Russian defence deals with India exceeded over $5 billion and with the United States around $4.4 billion.

The kind of weapon systems that India plans to purchase is stupefying. The Indian Army wants to equip all of its 382 infantry battalions and 44 mechanized infantry units with a fourth-generation shoulder-fired fire and forget anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) system. So India is procuring 321 ‘Spike’ systems, along with 8,356 missiles, from Israel. India is also purchasing one medium-range surface-to-air missile (MRSAM) regiment, composed of 18 firing units, from the Zionist state.

It has been reported that US defense contractor Boeing alone has won bids to supply the Indian military with 10 C-17 Globemaster-III strategic airlift aircraft (worth $4.1 billion), eight P-8I maritime patrol aircraft (worth $2.1. billion), 22 AH-64E Apache, and 15 CH-47F Chinook helicopters (both helicopter deals have a combined worth of $2.5 billion).

Moreover, the French aircraft maker Dassault Aviation has finalised a contract for the sale of 36 Rafale fourth-generation multi-role fighter jets to the Indian Air Force at an estimated cost of $9 billion. The European defense contractor EADS will supply six Airbus A330 Multi-role Tanker Transport aircraft for the IAF for $1 billion.

The major naval assets include 24 submarines over a period of 30 years. Six Scorpene class are being built at the Mazagaon Docks. All six are expected to join the Indian Navy by 2020. Purchase of six more was cleared in 2015.

Not to forget is the license production for Kamov 226 helicopters in India, purchase of 145 ultralight howitzer artillery guns from US, purchase of 100 155mm tracked artillery guns, purchase of 280 aero engines from Honeywell for Jaguar aircraft and purchase of five units of Russian-made S-400 advanced air defense systems.

In short, the kind of money being thrown around by India for weapon systems tells us about the insecurity of that country, failure to put in a place a viable domestic defence industry and lack of consideration for its own people, many of whom sleep on footpaths, have no toilets and get little to eat.



Fifth Column: Doubting Thomases

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by Tavleen Singh

The Indian Army has more credibility than the Pakistani Army in the eyes of most Indians, but not this lot. So the voices of what the Defence Minister called ‘doubting Thomases’ have been heard across the land.

As a consequence of India’s intellectual arena having been occupied since Nehruvian socialist times by a dictatorship of very illiberal leftists and liberals, English-speaking Indians have a self-loathing that is increasingly repugnant. This past week was a good one to see these self-loathing Indians in full fettle. This particular genre of Indian despises Narendra Modi, so they have been more than a little unnerved by the ‘surgical strikes’ in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, that the Indian Army conducted in retaliation for the murder of 19 soldiers. So a loud chorus has risen from ‘liberal quarters’ demanding ‘proof’ without anyone noticing that if we should be asking for proof, it ought to be from Pakistan’s military men. Proof that they have stopped using suicidal jihadists in their cowardly, undeclared war.

The Indian Army has more credibility than the Pakistani Army in the eyes of most Indians, but not this lot. So the voices of what the Defence Minister called ‘doubting Thomases’ have been heard across the land. Nothing happened at all, they say, and whatever happened has happened before so it’s wrong for the Prime Minister to try and take credit. In any case, the only solution is a dialogue not a violent response on the border. None of them noticed that their voices sounded worryingly similar to the voices of military men from across the border. This is not surprising since many of these doubters have long been involved in a process that has come to be known on the subcontinent as ‘track two diplomacy.’

Having been on more than one of these cross-border junkets, let me describe what happens. Us liberals go to Lahore or Islamabad or wherever and our Pakistani hosts pay for us to stay in nice hotels and then introduce us to charming liberals and leftists whose hospitality so overwhelms us that we rarely speak of difficult things. We never meet the military men who control the Indian jihad. The civilian leaders we meet are usually full of friendship and love. I met Nawaz Sharif on one of these junkets and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, but the only time I have met serving military officers is when I have gone to report on some election or coup. It is from meeting them many times that I have understood that, in their limited worldview, India will always be a hated enemy.

It is from conversations with these military men that I have learned that they believe that India will eventually break up and enable Pakistan to expand its territory and population by luring Indian Muslims to their side. So the real purpose of the jihadists, who the Pakistani army sends us, is to create communal tension by their acts of violence. Spokesmen for the Pakistani government like to say that once the ‘core issue’ of Kashmir is resolved, all tensions with India will end. This is rubbish and they know it. The only people who seem not to know it are the people I described in the first paragraph of this column.

This caboodle includes journalists, academics, bureaucrats, politicians, historians and even judges. They are bound together by the skein of their ‘secularism’ and their hatred of Modi. So they virtually constitute a fifth column of the Congress party without being its official spokesmen. When there is a Congress government in power, these worthies nearly always find (even in retirement) jobs that enable them to continue living in fine bungalows in Lutyens Delhi. Nothing inspires loyalty more than the patronage of this kind, and because they hide behind the shield of secularism, they are able easily to disguise their self-loathing.

It is this self-loathing that Pakistan has manipulated very well in the many, many rounds of futile dialogue that began soon after the Islamic Republic was born. Have you noticed that most commentators in the Indian media refer to a ‘deep state’ within Pakistan as if it were constituted by people outside the government? Have you noticed how this disguises the harsh truth that the Pakistani military is the Pakistani government? Have you noticed how we keep talking on our side of the border about the need to strengthen Pakistan’s elected leaders, without ever acknowledging that, in Punjab, jihadist leaders like Hafiz Saeed would not exist without the support of Nawaz Sharif and his brother who is Punjab’s chief minister?

If we want peace with the Islamic Republic next door, India will need to continue proving that she is stronger militarily, economically and in every other way. Only this will persuade Pakistan’s military men to abandon their dream of a greater Pakistan that will, they hope, be powerful enough to match India in every way. For the moment it is just a sad, shabby little country full of hatred and violence. It is seen this way even by countries that once were its friends, but India’s ‘liberals’ remain believers!


Why China Is Shielding Pakistan’s Strategic Assets

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Chinese and Pakistani troops post the launch of their first joint patrol of the border connecting PoK with Xinjiang province

Beijing’s protective armour is clearly part of a plan.

by Sandeep Unnithan

Buried in Pakistani journalist Cyril Almeida’s by now famous October 6 story of a civil-military rift within Pakistan is a nugget as explosive as the story’s main premise. Almeida story in The Dawn hints at China’s discomfiture with Pakistan’s use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy.

Almeida describes Pakistan’s foreign secretary Chaudhary speaking words to the effect that "while China has reiterated its support for Pakistan, it too has indicated a preference for a change in course by Pakistan. Specifically, while Chinese authorities have conveyed their willingness to keep putting on technical hold a UN ban on Jaish-e-Mohammed leader Masood Azhar, they have questioned the logic of doing so repeatedly".

On October 10, Beijing put India’s attempt to get the UN to ban the JeM’s Azhar on another three-month hold. China’s vice foreign minister Li Baodong made a preposterous suggestion that India was seeking political capital out of the move to designate Azhar a global terrorist. “There should be no double standards on counter-terrorism. No one should pursue own political gains in the name of counter-terrorism,” Baodong said.

China’s move to block the ban on someone who masterminded high-profile attacks on Indian soil this year at Pathankot and Uri might sound bizarre. China’s block on the ban was raised by Prime Minister Narendra Modi when he met President Xi Jinping in Goa as part of the BRICS summit in Goa on October 15.

But Beijing’s protective shield is clearly part of a plan.

Pakistan’s deep state revived Masood Azhar’s Jaish-e-Mohammed only in 2014. This followed a post 26/11 diplomatic initiative by India globally spotlighted the Lashkar-e-Taiba and its chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed. This culminated Saeed being declared a globally designated terrorist by the UN on December 17, 2008.

China’s blocking action at the UN essentially completes a circle of shielding Pakistan’s twin "strategic assets"— terrorists and nuclear weapons.

In Deception

Pakistan, the United States and the secret trade in nuclear weapons, investigative journalists Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott exposed the sordid truth about Libyan dictator Muammar Gadaffi’s quest for the bomb. Libya wound up its nascent nuclear weapons program and surrendered its plans to the United Nations in January 2004 — blueprints for a Chinese CHIC-4 nuclear fission device came from Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. AQ Khan’s nuclear black market. The most brazen peddling of nuclear arms in the 20th century came in a decidedly casual wrapping — the blueprints were wrapped in plastic bags of "Good Looks Fabrics and Tailors" in Islamabad.

The drawings and step-by-step instructions on assembling a nuclear weapon, most of them in Chinese, left no doubt whatsoever of the provenance of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Chinese assistance enabled Pakistan to leapfrog India’s nuclear weapons program. They had their genesis in two tectonic events in the late 1970s which gave the Pakistan army a new warfighting strategy.

The 1977 coup by General Zia-ul-Haq saw the military hang the initiator of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme—the hapless President ZA Bhutto. The Pakistan army took over the civilian-led nuclear weapons program. It has not let go ever since. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 saw the Pakistan army and its ISI receive billions of dollars of US arms and assistance to fund a war against the occupying Soviets.

China, by now on the side of the US following the Nixon-Kissinger breakthrough of 1972, also supplied weapons in the Afghan war against the Soviets. In 1981, President Ronald Reagan rolled back sanctions imposed by his predecessors to punish Pakistan’s nuclear weapons pursuit. He offered Pakistan a massive five-year aid package totaling $3 billion including $100 million in a year in economic assistance and $400 million a year in loans to buy military equipment. The transfers also included F-16 fighter aircraft which gave Pakistan the capability to deliver nuclear weapons.

The nine-year-long resistance fought by the Mujahideen and controlled by the Pakistan army’s ISI established and strengthened the foundations of the deep state. By the early 1990s, GHQ Rawalpindi had recalibrated its strategy to what can best be described as a sword and shield: the sword of terrorism/non-state actors and the shield of nuclear weapons. The Pakistan army would use the sword of terrorism to inflict death by a thousand cuts against India even as the shield of nuclear weapons protected itself against a military riposte.

By the early 1990s, Pakistan’s deep state trained, funded and raised the Afghan Taliban to control the narrative on its western borders, in Afghanistan. Nuclear weapons and terrorists had become strategic assets for the Pakistan army. Multiple attacks on Indian soil began from the 1993 serial blasts in Mumbai.

These strikes culminated in the savage November 26, 2008, attacks on Mumbai, arguably the most brazen attempt to test the threshold of India’s tolerance since the December 13, 2001, attack on India’s parliament. The parliament attack led to the massive ten-month deployment of Indian forces in Operation Parakram. The failed deployment led to the drafting of the "Cold Start" strategy to rapidly mobilize Indian forces and mount a swift response.

The UPA government in 2008 resisted the urge to even carry out token punitive strikes against Pakistan’s terrorist proxies. Pakistan, nevertheless, perfected what could be best called a "counter Cold Start" strategy — testing and deploying tactical nuclear weapons to blunt an Indian military assault.

The surgical strikes of September 29 authorized by the Modi government in retaliation for the Uri attacks in which 19 Indian army soldiers were killed, have demonstrated the chinks in the sword and shield strategy and indeed in the counter Cold Start. Besides the range of political, diplomatic and economic options like the cancellation of the SAARC summit in Islamabad, the surgical strikes have demonstrated the existence of the space for sub-conventional military options.

China’s President Xi Jingping has authored a new initiative to bind Pakistan, Beijing’s "batie" (Iron Brother) in a military-economic embrace. GHQ Rawalpindi is almost certainly working out its new strategy factoring Beijing in its response against India.

Source>>

‘Triple-checked’ Facts of Civilian-Army Rift Story, Says Pakistan Journalist Cyril Almeida

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"Because nothing of the reaction had been unanticipated, nothing had been left to chance before the story was put out in print," Cyril Almeida said.

A prominent Pakistani journalist, who was briefly barred from travelling abroad over reporting a rift between the civilian and military leaderships, today stuck to his story, saying he had “triple-checked” the facts. “Because nothing of the reaction had been unanticipated, nothing had been left to chance before the story was put out in print,” Cyril Almeida, a columnist and reporter for the Dawn, said in his column ‘A week to remember’ published in today’s edition of the newspaper.

He wrote: “The story had arrived fairly quickly after the fateful meeting on October 3, but it was only published on October 6. The gap was all about verifying, double- and triple-sourcing and seeking official comment.

In his story ‘Act against militants or face international isolation’, Almeida reported that the civilian government has warned the military leadership of a growing international isolation of Pakistan and sought action against banned terror groups, like Hafiz Saeed’s LeT, Masood Azhar’s JeM and the Haqqani network, or face international isolation.

The Nawaz Sharif government denied the facts of the story and subsequently placed Almeida’s name on the Exit Control List (ECL), barring him from leaving the country. However, under media pressure, the government on Friday removed his name from the list but constituted a committee to probe the matter.

The development was followed by a Corps Commanders’ Conference last week presided over by army chief Gen Raheel Sharif in which concerns were raised on feeding “story that was a breach of security”.

In his comments today, Almeida further said: “For me, and for the paper, there were only two questions that mattered. Did the meeting take place? Could I verify through multiple channels what was said? Yes, the heart races a bit faster when you do something out of the ordinary. Yes, there is always some concern for the self.

“The second part is trickier than it would appear, but it is also not as hard as it is made out to be. Stick around long enough and you get a sense of how this place works. And the place gets a sense of you. You know the camps, you know the divisions and splits, and you know at any given time who may be interested in selling what. They exist in civilian as much as they do in military.”

He added that with a meeting like this and a story like that, “you sniff around until you get a bunch of overlapping facts from camps that have no obvious reason to overlap”.

Almeida said there was one underestimation on his part.

“In writing the story, I was aware that a grenade was being dropped in the news cycle. It has since turned out to be a surgical strike followed by a nuclear attack. I do not regret doing this story. In a place like this, that is a two- way street: in return for not exposing your sources, you get a fair reading of the land,” he added.

Almeida said global coverage of his name placing on the ECL has rescued him.

“A combination of two things rescued me. First, the global coverage, the system here ultimately responds to local concerns. Second, the wider media, battered and fractured by violent convulsions of its own in recent years, mostly united — perhaps as much out of self-preservation than indignation,” he said.


Production of K226-T Helicopter Marks Major Step In India-Russia Ties: ROSTEC CEO

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Russian defense manufacturer ROSTEC on Saturday said the production of K226T helicopters would mark a major step in the long-time cooperation and relationship between India and Russia.

Addressing the media here, Rostec CEO Sergey Chemezov said Russia since 1990's have contributed significantly in defense cooperation with India, especially in the production of Sukhoi military planes.

"India has been our long time friend and our long time partner. We have been involved in multiple important projects for them for a very long time. Our joint productions have gone quite well, most notably in the 1990's we had the licenced production of the Sukhoi military planes in India," he said.

"Today we have signed a very important agreement on the production of K226T helicopters in India, this marks another serious step in our long-time cooperation and a long-time relationship," he added.

Responding to a poser regarding the completion of fifth-generation fighter program Sukhoi PAK FA, Chemezov, said, "As for the timeline, they are close to being done. I hope that all formalities are being sorted out. We see that they are close to being done by the end of this year."



The Sukhoi PAK FA is a fifth generation fighter aircraft (FGFA) which is being co-developed by Sukhoi and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) for the Indian Air Force. It is a derivative project from the PAK FA (T-50 is the prototype) being developed for the Indian Air Force (FGFA is the official designation for the Indian version).

Chemezov further said the company has signed an agreement in the joint production with Indian pharmaceutical company Cipla.

"India has a very strong industry in terms of pharmaceuticals and we have signed an agreement in the joint production with a major Indian pharmaceutical company, Cipla, which would give full life cycle, full production of pharmaceuticals with Indian technologies for the Russian markets," he added.


Selective Approach To Terrorism Will Be Futile: PM Modi At BRICS Summit

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Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping after the press statement during BRICS Summit in Benaulim Goa on Sunday

A selective approach to countering terrorist individuals or organizations will be futile and counter-productive, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said on Sunday.

Speaking at a plenary session of the BRICS Summit in Goa, Modi said the reach of terrorism was global and called for deeper engagement between the national security advisers of the five member nations – Brazil, India, China, Russia and South Africa.

“Terrorists funding, their weapon supply, training and political support must be systematically cut off. Selective approaches to terrorist individuals and organizations will not only be futile but also counter-productive,” Modi said.

“Our response to terrorism must, therefore, be nothing less than comprehensive … we need to act both individually and collectively.”

Modi’s remarks came just hours after he launched a scathing but unnamed attack on Pakistan, calling it the “mother-ship” of terrorism with whom extremist modules across the world are linked.

“There must be no distinction based on artificial or self-serving grounds,” Modi added, in what was seen as a nudge to neighboring China that remained noncommittal on countering Pakistan.

In his speech, the prime minister outlined five goals for the summit: One, focus on continuance of institution building within BRICS nations; second, transform the trade and investment linkages among the five countries; third, focus on key economic priorities; four, secure the countries against the threat of terrorism and fifth, enhance people-to-people contact.

“We agreed that those who nurture, shelter, support and sponsor forces of violence and terror are as much a threat to us as terrorists themselves,” Modi said later in the day.

“We were also one in agreeing that BRICS need to work together and act decisively to combat this threat.”

On Saturday, India won strong backing on terrorism from Russian President Vladimir Putin, prompting Modi to say Moscow’s stand on the issue “mirrors our own”. But Indian officials speaking about the prime minister’s meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping used rather defensive language, signalling little progress in those talks.

Beijing gave no assurance on supporting New Delhi’s bid on a United Nations ban against Pakistan-based militant leader Masood Azhar, saying no more than that terrorism was a “key issue” and the two sides should strengthen their security dialogue and partnership.

“We underscored the need for close coordination on tracking sources of terrorist financing and targeting the hardware of terrorism, including weapons’ supplies, ammunition, equipment and training,” Modi said.


Hope To Sign FGFA Deal With India By Year-End: Russia

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Under the new offer, India will have to pay about $3.7 billion, instead of $ 6 billion, for the technological know-how and three prototypes of the fighters, defense sources have said.

BENAULIM (GOA): With military deals worth about Rs 60,000 crore signed and sealed with India here, Russia is hopeful that another big ticket agreement on Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft will be inked by year-end.

"The agreement had been completed on our end, we are ready to sign it. It is now down to the Indian side.

"There are some formalities to figure out, but I think it will be signed by the end of this year," Sergei Chemezov, CEO of Rostec State Corporation, a Russian umbrella organization of 700 hi-tech civilian and military firms, said here.

After a hiatus of nearly a year, India and Russia had in February revived talks on the much delayed FGFA project after a clearance from Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar.

Since then, a lot of issues related to work share, IPR and technology transfer among others have been sorted out between the two sides along with the monetary commitments.

Under the new offer, India will have to pay about $3.7 billion, instead of $ 6 billion, for the technological know-how and three prototypes of the fighters, defense sources have said.

In 2010, India had agreed to pay $295 million towards the preliminary design of the fighter, called in India as Perspective Multirole Fighter (PMF).

"The FGFA project will produce a state of the art fighter jet, and it will be the result of the work on Russia's most modern technology done by both Russian and Indian engineers and constructors," Chemezov said.

"As a Fifth Generation, it means fifth generation speed, ballistics and military equipment, avionics and stealth capabilities among other qualities," he said.

"It shall be on a par with the capabilities of Russia's PAK-FA T-50 aircraft, a Fifth-Generation fighter but as it will be designed in the next few years, it is likely to exceed it in some specifics.

"Our technology is always developing," the Russia's top defense industry official said.


Sealing The Border: After Strikes, Walking The Line of Control

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New Delhi is rolling out a plan to hermetically seal its borders with Pakistan — a dramatic expansion of technology on existing fencing on the 3,323-km land border and 740-km LoC for an integrated system that links drones, sensors, radars, and cameras.

by Praveen Swami

Late one evening in the winter of 1987, as his minibus pulled into the Kupwara bus stand after a bone-rattling ride from Sopore, Syed Bashir Ahmad decided he wanted a new life. His passengers that day included a gaggle of Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front recruits, among the first wave headed for training at Inter-Services Intelligence-run camps in Pakistan. Ahmad decided to go along. That evening, he began the short hike across the Line of Control (LoC) towards Dudhnial, past India’s last military outpost, Gulab — there wasn’t a soldier in sight.

Almost three decades later, New Delhi is rolling out a plan to hermetically seal its borders with Pakistan — a dramatic expansion of technology on existing fencing on the 3,323-km land border and 740-km LoC for an integrated system that links drones, sensors, radars, and cameras. The goal: Reduce the odds that anyone like Ahmad — he is out on bail after being arrested on his return in 2012 — would have of crossing over to zero.

Led by retired bureaucrat Madhukar Gupta, the classified report of a committee that recommended the reforms calls the fence ‘a permanent strategic asset’ after the terrorist attacks in Gurdaspur and Pathankot, followed by Uri, as well as a surge in infiltration in Kashmir — around 150 terrorists this year, up from 100 last year and upwards of 1,500 before the 2003 ceasefire allowed India to start building up its fence at the LoC.

Falling number of active terrorists in J&K: 1,700 to 146 in 10 years

Experts, though, are skeptical if India’s wall will work. “Nowhere in the world has a wall ended terrorism. Even worse, they often induce false complacency, and suck resources from more important tasks,” says a border security official.

From the dawn of modern warfare, vulnerable states have relied on walls to beat off predatory armies — with mixed results. China’s Great Wall held off barbarian marauders until Genghis Khan’s highly mobile horse-borne forces breached it in the 13th century. The battlements that guarded Constantinople could not protect it from Mehmet II’s artillery and engineers in 1453. France’s supposedly-impregnable Maginot Line was side-stepped by Nazi mechanized forces within days.

India’s wall had its genesis in the late 1980s, as security forces in Punjab struggled to fence off routes supplying Khalistan terrorists with weapons and cadre. The end of that insurgency in 1992 was attributed, in part, to the fence, leading to the adoption of the model in Rajasthan and Gujarat. In the late-1990s, the Border Security Force (BSF) pushed forward the fence along the International Border in Jammu, often engaging in construction under direct fire, using metal plates as shields.

It wasn’t until 2003, though, when the unsigned ceasefire went into force, that fencing could be undertaken on the LoC. The immediate results of the three-tier fencing were dramatic, with infiltration tapering off. In 2002, Intelligence Bureau figures show, over half of all infiltrating terrorists made it across the LoC. In 2010, 52 of 247 attempts were estimated to be successful; in 2012, 97 of 277; and, in 2014, 65 of 209. These numbers have justified the almost Sisyphean task of maintaining the fence: three-quarters of stretches along the LoC have to be rebuilt after each winter because of avalanches and landslides.

But is reduced infiltration a result of the fence — or a consequence of Pakistan turning off the terror tap because of international pressure? Army studies show it takes terrorists about eight minutes to cut a passage through the fence, suggesting determined adversaries can get through far easier than imagined, particularly under covering fire. This year, infiltration has gone up again, in large part because cross-border firing has made Indian defences vulnerable.

Even the United States’ state-of-the-art anti-immigrant fence with Mexico, experts point out, remains surprisingly permeable. In a recent paper, scholar Pia Orrenius noted that “when one site has been chosen for a crackdown, migrants have responded by crossing elsewhere”. US officials have pointed to a plunge in the number of illegal migrants caught on the southern border — where over 700 of the 2,000 miles are fenced off — from over 1.6 million in 2000 to around 400,000 in 2014. But a single kilometer of that fence cost up to $6 million to build and $6.5 billion to operate over 20 years.


Experts say funding for capital-intensive projects drains resources from less visible counter-terrorism investments. In recent years, most Indian states have seen severe cuts in police budgets, after the central government scrapped support for some modernisation programs introduced after 26/11. In border states like Punjab, police have had to call off night patrols, because of shortages of funds for fuel and vehicle maintenance. More than 200 bullet-proof vehicles whose engines were destroyed by the Kashmir floods are yet to be replaced.

Then again, no one in government is quite sure just how effective the new border move will be. “Each barrier leads terrorists to invent a work-around, there is no such thing as a silver bullet,” says a government official.

The world’s Other Walls

To keep immigrants out, to beat back terrorists, to hold back insurgents: 34 fortified boundaries have been built since 1990, and many European countries have plans on the anvil now.

US-Mexico | 3,360 km (under construction)

* Intended to block the flow of immigrants from Mexico to the United States, the fence has become a major election issue, with Republican candidate Donald Trump vowing to make Mexico pay for its construction. Now spanning 930 km, the barriers focus on areas where immigrants most often passed into the US, using a mix of air surveillance, sensors, cameras and on-ground interdiction. The barriers have seen a sharp drop in the numbers of illegal immigrants arrested, which authorities claim as evidence of their success.

Western Sahara Berm | 2,700 km

* The Berm, or sand wall, runs through the Western Sahara and southeastern Morocco, separating the Moroccan-controlled southern provinces and the Polisario-controlled Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. Its purpose was to keep out Polisario insurgents from the Moroccan-controlled territory. The Berm consists of sand and stone walls about 3 meters high, with cobra-wire fences throughout. There are guardposts and bunkers every few kilometers, while artillery posts and airfields line the Moroccan-controlled side.

Iran-Pakistan | 700 km

* Intended as a counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism barrier, the Iran-Pakistan fence is a 100 cm thick, 3-m-high concrete wall, fortified with steel rods, running the length of the frontier from Taftan to Mand. The project includes large earth and stone embankments as well as deep ditches to deter illegal crossings and drug smuggling into Iran. The border region is dotted with police observation towers and fortress-style garrisons for troops. Baloch nationalists have opposed the fence, saying it will further divide the ethnic group, who live on both sides of the border.

Israel-Gaza | 60 km

* Touted as the most sophisticated counter-terrorism fence in the world, the Israel-Gaza barrier was built in 1994—and again in 2000, after being demolished by Palestinians—in response to suicide attacks and arms smuggling by terrorist groups. The fence uses physical means, as well as an array of electronic surveillance means, to restrict the movement of would-be attackers and weapons. However, terrorists responded to its construction by using rockets and mortar, forcing the Israeli army to intervene in Gaza—the outcome the fence was meant to avoid. Terrorists also burrowed tunnels under the fence, which Israel is now seeking to counter by building underground walls.



Lock, Stock And No Smoking Barrel

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by Namrata Biji Ahuja and Ajit K. Dubey

There is no perceivable evidence of India’s covert operation across the LoC, precisely because it was what our special forces intended. THE WEEK brings you exclusive details about what happened before, during and after those crucial four hours when our men were out avenging Uri

Exclusive details about what happened before, during and after those crucial four hours when our men were out avenging Uri

There was no surgical strike. What the Indian Army did to seven Pakistan Army-guarded terrorist launch pads across the Line of Control was a covert commando operation. An eminently successful one at that.

A surgical strike, says the Macmillan Dictionary, is “a military attack, especially by air, that is designed to destroy something specific and to avoid wider damage”. The common military understanding is that it is an attack carried out without warning and intended to deal only with a specific target. Such operations are quick and covert, but the result is left open for the world to see. The classic example is Israel’s air raid on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981.

What the Indian Army did on the night of September 28-29 was a slow and laborious operation, which had troops creeping, climbing and crawling across the LoC and across two kilometres of rugged terrain, avoiding stepping on land-mines or alerting village dogs, reaching largely undefended targets, catching the enemy off-guard, killing him and destroying his camp in the dark. No photos sent, no bodies carried back, no trophies. But they did it.


As much was conceded, though inadvertently, by Air Marshal (retd) Shahzad Chaudhry of the Pakistan Air Force: “What India has done is an LoC violation. Not a surgical strike.”

The Indian Army had done it earlier, too (see graphics). Pointed out Lt Gen Hardev Singh Lidder, former chief of Integrated Defence Staff and veteran special forces officer: “We have had strikes earlier, but those were mostly local. This is the first time that strikes were carried out as a national policy.”

The idea of a covert counterstrike was mooted on September 18 night, when Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar and Army chief Dalbir Singh Suhag were flying back to Delhi from the brigade headquarters in Uri, where 18 soldiers had been killed in a terror strike early that morning. Parrikar wanted the general to give him a few actionable options that they could present to Prime Minister Narendra Modi in the cabinet committee on security the following day.

Meanwhile, Modi had been in touch with National Security Adviser Ajit Doval. He wanted to know whether the attack had a confirmed Pakistani link. Yes, said Doval. A GPS set found on the attackers had shown that they had come from across the LoC.

That night, on Gen Suhag’s orders, the directorate-general of military operations headed by Lt Gen Ranbir Singh burnt the midnight oil. Doval ordered all intelligence inputs, from the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), the Research and Analysis Wing, and the Intelligence Bureau, to be made available to the DGMO. But Ranbir Singh had a problem. The Army’s Northern Command had informed him of the existence of 30-odd launch pads across the LoC within striking distance, but they had all been emptied out immediately after the Uri attack. Yes, the Pakistanis were expecting payback.

A launchpad, as an officer explained to THE WEEK, is like a bus shelter. The training camps, mostly run by ex-army officers on the payroll of outfits like Lashkar-e-Taiba, are deep inside Pakistan-occupied Kashmir—often 30 to 40km inside. From there, the trained boys are taken to the launchpads, where they spend days until the coast is clear for infiltration. Guides, mostly villagers and double agents, take them across the LoC.

At the cabinet committee on security the following day, the Army’s proposals (“not one, but several,” said a senior officer) were discussed. An in-principle clearance for an operation was given. (The final clearance would come a week later.) Meanwhile, Doval advised the committee to discuss other options like revisiting the Indus Water Treaty, stopping trade and suspending diplomatic relations. “All that talk created the clutter that we wanted,” said the officer. “It also lured the enemy into thinking that we wouldn’t hit back.”

The trick worked. “In a few days, we had inputs that the launchpads were again getting peopled,” said the officer. The enemy had an urgency. It would start snowing in a few days and the infiltration routes would get blocked.

Once the in-principle go-ahead was issued, Modi called on President Pranab Mukherjee and briefed him. On September 20, Doval told the PM that a defensive approach would not suffice this time. “We need to be offensive-defensive,” he is said to have told Modi.

Once Modi charged him with overseeing what could be done, the first thing Doval did was to “empower” the chiefs of the forces, the various intelligence gathering units and the surveillance agencies to forget procedural clearances. “If there are any glitches, sort them out yourselves. Share as much as you can among yourselves,” Doval is said to have told them.

The chiefs did not have a problem. They knew that the Army had resorted to cross-LoC actions several times in the past, but it was the first time they were being asked by the political leadership to do it. All such actions in the past had been cleared at the brigade, division, corps or command level.

The political clearance eased things. For the first time, the agencies opened their operational rooms to other agencies. The uphill task was to decipher the satellite imagery and provide real-time technical intelligence to the Army’s Northern Command headquarters in Udhampur, which would have to supervise the strike. “For any intelligence agency, assets and techniques are paramount,” explained an NTRO officer. “They cannot be accessed by even the chiefs of other agencies. For the first time, we allowed the Army inside our base and they allowed our men. At both the locations, our men were sitting together. As a result, what would have taken five to eight hours for one agency to decipher, was done in five minutes.”

Meanwhile, the Northern Command, headed by Lt Gen D.S. Hooda, was making its own assessments. He had the freedom to choose the targets. The morale of the military was paramount. So was the timing. Hooda asked the formation commanders under him to identify 150 commandos for a few tasks. The commanders chose three broad target areas which fell under the 19 Division (Uri), 28 Division (Kupwara) and 25 Division (Rajouri). By then, the military’s own intelligence, too, had provided targets across Uri, Poonch and Bhimber sectors.

But who would do the strikes? It had to be a commando operation undertaken by the special forces. The two units chosen for the task were the Udhampur-based 9 Para (SF) and 4 Para (SF), commanded by Col Kapil Yadav and Col J.S. Sandhu, respectively.

An SF battalion comprises four assault teams which have close to 100 men. The teams are further divided into three assault troops comprising 24 men, supported by troopers who operate heavy weapons such as RPO7 flamethrowers and PK machine guns. But Hooda correctly assessed that the operation could not just be ‘outsourced’ to the special forces. The units that had taken the terrorist hit at Uri would like to have their pound of flesh. So a few Ghatak commandos of the 10 Dogra, 6 Bihar and 19 Punjab, which are otherwise regular infantry, were also selected. They were to avenge the death of their buddies.

Hooda now ordered a few diversionary activities. Formations were told to move troops along the 250km arc from Uri to Rajouri sectors on the LoC to confuse the enemy. Artillery batteries were asked to open up all along to keep the Pakistani posts engaged. The IAF’s Western Command also chipped in. It restarted its Exercise Talon, which had been put on hold because of a mishap involving a Jaguar deep-strike aircraft in Ambala. As the airspace on the Indian side got saturated with Indian fighter flying, the Pakistan Air Force suspended all civilian air activity over PoK and Gilgit-Baltistan, and kept its air defences on high alert.

When Modi was addressing BJP workers in Kozhikode in Kerala on September 24, Lt Gen Ranbir Singh was conferring with Lt Gen Satish Dua, commander of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps, and Lt Gen N.N. Nimbhorkar, commander of the Nagrota-based 16 Corps. And, in an undisclosed location, the SF troopers were practicing strikes.

As soon as Modi returned from Kozhikode, there were further diversionary tactics at the political and diplomatic level. On September 26, he summoned experts and explored the possibility of choking the Indus waters. As think-tanks, the media and the government’s spin-doctors discussed the pluses and minuses of the move, others speculated on how China would hit back by choking the Brahmaputra. The spin the following day was about severing trade ties and diplomatic links.

The final go-ahead was given on September 27. A couple of hours before the H-Hour, the Kupwara division intensified small arms and mortar fire. By then, the assault troops of 24 each from 9 Para (SF) and 4 Para (SF) had been divided into four groups of 12 each. They had been taken by helicopters to four locations on the Indian side of the LoC in Kel, Tutmari Gali, Nangi Tekri and Baalnoi post in Mendhar sector. “No helicopter flew to the other side,” said an officer.

A couple of teams slipped out between the Beloni and Nangi Tekri battalion areas in Poonch sector and across the Tutmari Gali in the Nowgam sector. The Ghatak teams were pushed in separately, but they were told that the assault would be made by the para commandos. They could join the fight and kill if the enemy opened fire on the commandos on their way back.

Around 11pm on September 28, Parrikar and Doval reached the Army’s operations room. Gen Suhag was waiting for them. The three had skipped a dinner hosted by the Coast Guard chief for his commanders’ conference.

The Ghatak teams had crossed the LoC the previous evening and had been lying in wait. The idea was that even if they were caught, the Pak troopers would have thought of them as teams who had come to avenge the killing of their buddies. Any exchange of fire with them would have also been a diversionary tactic from the main operation.

About an hour after the midnight of September 28, the commandos crossed the barbed-wire fences, which in most places are about a kilometer short of the LoC. There was a nip in the night air, a sign of the approaching winter. In a few days, there would be snowfall, and the passes and tracks would become difficult to traverse. That also meant another certainty, confirmed by the NTRO’s decoded maps: the launchpads had been peopled again with infiltrators. “The enemy had evacuated all launchpads immediately after the Uri attack,” said an officer. “But the boys were brought back because they had to be sent across before the passes got blocked.”

How did the commandos get to know of the tracks? “Didn’t you know of the guides on the LoC?” asked an officer. “There are local villagers who help the infiltrators. They also help us. Some are from our side; some from the other.”

By around 1am, most teams had traversed the stretch between the fence and the LoC, and crossed into enemy territory. They hardly carried any electronic equipment, for fear of being caught by the enemy’s electronic sensors. They knew the coordinates of the terrorist launchpads from the satellite images provided by the NTRO. A few maps had also shown unusual activity at some of the launch pads on previous days.

The commandos knew one thing for sure. The boys at the launch pads would not be armed. The Pak army never allowed terrorists to roam around the nearby villages with arms. They were given arms only when their mission began.

The SF troops, wearing jungle camouflage, walked slowly with the aid of night vision devices and night sights on their Tavor rifles, and reached their designated targets. There was little resistance from the Pakistan troops. Most pickets on the LoC were still being engaged by the Indian small arms fire. The few soldiers who were guarding the launchpads were gunned down in no time.

As the SF troops reached the villages housing the launchpads, they barged into the buildings and used the Russian RPO7 flamethrowers, which created a temperature of 3,000 degrees Celsius and caused massive explosions. Once they reached their targets, it was more of an arson exercise than actually engaging the enemy in combat.

The job was done in less than 40 minutes in most target areas. The commandos returned before daybreak with Ghatak troopers guarding their rear. “Once the troops returned to their launch bases, helicopters were sent to fetch the officers, who were lifted straight to Udhampur and Nagrota for debriefing,” said the officer. Overall, the operations lasted almost four hours. Four to five launchpads (whether one was actually a launchpad or an abandoned village hut was not certain), located up to 2km deep in enemy territory, had been destroyed.

How many did they kill? The Army is not giving specific numbers, because “they just set fire to the launchpads and made a quick exit. No one knows how many were there inside.” The estimate is 40 to 45 killed, based on estimates of the number of persons each launchpad can hold. But five launch pads and two Pakistan army posts—which were co-located with the launchpads—were destroyed and all occupants killed. The most realistic estimate is that about 30 were killed in three launchpads.

A statement released by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations said, “At least two army men were killed as Indian and Pakistani troops exchanged fire over the LoC in Azad Jammu and Kashmir.” A few hours later, ISPR released the photographs of the dead soldiers, havildars Jumma Khan and Naik Imtiaz. The casualty on the Indian side? Two para commandos injured in landmine blasts on their way back.

By 4.30am on September 30, the operation was declared successful and Modi was briefed. The PM was not shown a “live telecast” of the operation, as reported by some.

Early morning, Lt Gen Ranbir Singh called up his Pakistani counterpart, Maj Gen Sahir Shamshad Mirza, who had taken over recently as director-general of military operations, and told him that India had struck at the launchpads in the territory under his control.

Uri was avenged.


MSMEs Eye Defense Windfall, But Here’s What They Must Do First

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by Puneet Kaura

The Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP), announced recently, finally delivers Indian MSMEs, a growth opportunity they have long been waiting for. The advantages that MSMEs will leverage are their innovative capabilities in niche manufacturing, greater flexibility, lower overhead costs and their ability to learn and absorb new technologies quickly.

MSME sector already contributes a significant 38% to the nation’s GDP and 40% and 45% to the overall exports and manufacturing output, respectively. It is engaged in the manufacturing of over 6,000 products ranging from traditional to hi-tech items. However, till now the MSMEs contribution in defence sector was limited to just 9%.

According to figures shared by the defence minister, Manohar Parrikar, last year procurement from MSMEs reached 9%, and in the current year, it will reach 15%. Volumes are also set to increase from R40,000 crore in 2014, to R52,000 crore in the current year.

There are nearly 6,000 MSMEs across the country supplying components and sub-assemblies to the DPSUs, ordnance factories, DRDO and private industries.

As per latest industry reports, India’s defence budget accounted for nearly 17.2% of the total central government expenditure, at R19.78 lakh crore (about $294.36 billion). In terms of defence spends as a percentage of the GDP, India stands fifth globally. Nearly 60% of the defence need is met through imports putting a huge dent on India’s fiscal health. Therefore, boosting ‘Make in India’ initiative via MSMEs and integrating this sector with global supply chain can be a panacea for managing current account deficit, when oil prices rise again.

As a sequel to 100% FDI in defence production sector, several foreign majors have already made their entry into India. Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Saab, Bell Helicopter, Rolls Royce, Northrop Gruman, Rolta, BAE Systems, Dassault, Honeywell, Thales and Finmeccanica are some of the big foreign players actively looking at Indian market. These companies will have to depend on MSMEs to meet their offset obligation for a host of purposes: equipment, spares, IT-related services and other techno-commercial services.

The government has initiated host of measures for simplification of procedures to policy change for boosting manufacturing in defence sector based on priority of MSMEs Sector, these include:

  • Allowing 100% FDI in defence sector and announcement of DPP. The new DPP encourages the MSMEs associated with the industry with funding up to 90% of their project’s prototype development cost. Adding another safeguard, the MoD has also stated that it will reimburse the remaining 10% prototype development cost, if the request for proposal (RFP) is not called within a stipulated timeframe after the successful test of prototypes.

  • Outsourcing and Vendor Development Guidelines for DPSUs and OFBs have been formulated and circulated to them. The guidelines also include vendor development for import substitution.

  • The Exchange Rate Variation (ERV) protection has been allowed on foreign exchange component to all Indian companies including private companies in all categories of capital acquisitions.

  • The anomalies in excise duty/custom duty have been removed. Now, Indian industries (public and private) are subjected to the same kind of excise and custom duty levies.

  • The defence products list for the purpose of issuing Industrial Licences (ILs) under IDR Act has been revised and most of the components, parts, sub-systems, testing equipment, and production equipment have been removed from the list.

  • The initial validity of the IL granted under the IDR Act has been increased from 7 years to 15 years with a provision to further extend it by 3 years.

  • The Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for the issue of no-objection certificate (NOC) for export of military stores has been revised wherein; end-user certificate (EUC) to be countersigned/stamped by the government authorities has been done away with for the export of parts, components, sub-systems, etc.

With these policy shifts taking place, MSMEs can complement large defence hardware manufacturing industries as ancillary units in time to come.

In the case of indigenous manufacture of defence hardware, a substantial portion of the work can be transferred to the MSMEs by the DPSUs and OEMs. They can now act as strategic partners with DPSUs, foreign defence manufacturers and the larger corporates.

The first steps have to come from MSME-based industries followed by a government push. MSMEs need to understand OEM expectations in terms of quality and supply commitments which require them to invest in technology, research and manpower training in anticipation of a contract.

The government and private players have acknowledged the fact that India needs to increase self-reliance in defence production. Today, it is imperative for Indian companies, especially MSMEs, to integrate themselves to global supply chains of national and international defence majors, to reduce dependence on foreign supplies.

The author is MD and CEO, Samtel Avionics. Views are personal


Has Chinese Pressure Forced Pakistan U-Turn On Anti-India Terror Groups?

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Plans to disarm Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba come after two deadly attacks on Indian military bases – and amid Beijing’s security fears for its investments

by Tom Hussain

China’s disapproval of Pakistan’s hosting of anti-India terror organisations has prompted Islamabad to quietly start working on plans to disarm these jihadist groups, amid an unusually public row between the civilian government, the all-powerful military and the media over the policy shift.

Pressure has been mounting at home and abroad for action against terror groups Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba after two attacks on Indian military bases this year, the last one in September in which militants killed 18 Indian soldiers in the troubled Kashmir region.

Indian people pay tribute to the 18 soldiers killed in a militant attack in Uri near the Line of Control on 18 September. Photo: AFP

The government is yet to make an official announcement about expanding a nationwide counter-terrorism operation, launched against Taliban insurgents and sectarian groups in 2014, to encompass India-focused jihads. Pakistani officials have so far been telling foreign diplomats that anti-India groups have been spared because the government fears sweeping action would prompt these militants to join the Taliban insurgency.

How India-Pakistan tensions (and US-China rivalry) are raising nuclear stakes

National security policy and decision-making is a sensitive subject in Pakistan, in part because it is considered the domain of the military, which has directly ruled the country for nearly half its 69-year history and continues to exert enormous influence.

The Pakistani news media also exercises great discretion on national security matters, partly under pressure from the authorities, and has echoed government policy during the recent eruption of hostilities with India along the de facto border in Kashmir, part of which is claimed by China.

Why China is caught in India-Pakistan crossfire

The silence was broken last week by Dawn, Pakistan’s leading English-language newspaper, which reported that Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry had told a meeting of civil and military leaders that China had “indicated a preference for a change in course by Pakistan” on its handling of anti-India jihadist groups.

An Indian girl paying tribute to Indian Army martyrs killed in the Uri attack by Pak terrrorists

Chinese authorities also apparently “questioned the logic” of blocking India’s application to the United Nations Security Council to declare Jaish-e-Mohammed leader Masood Azhar a global terrorist, the country’s top diplomat reportedly told the meeting chaired by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

China itself placed a three-month “hold” on the application in April and extended it for a second time last month to protect Pakistan from a likely subsequent Indian application seeking to declare it a terrorist state for failing to prevent jihadist groups from launching attacks from its soil.

China is Pakistan’s closest diplomatic ally, leading defence supplier and top foreign investor, and its views are deeply respected in Islamabad.


Pakistan’s military admits for the first time that Islamic State gained foothold in their country

But security experts said China’s support for Pakistan might have limits, even if it had strengthened during Pakistan’s tensions with India.

“India and China share a concern about terrorist groups in Pakistan. New Delhi worries about the anti-India groups while Beijing fears the Taliban outfits that threaten Chinese investments in Pakistan and Afghanistan,” said Michael Kugelman, senior associate for South and Southeast Asia at the Woodrow Wilson Centre, a Washington think tank.

Afghan Taliban leader preached in Pakistan for years, despite government ‘Crackdown’

“In this regard, China would be shooting itself in the foot if it were to reflexively oppose Indian efforts to target terror groups in Pakistan.”

Without naming either state, China’s deputy minister for foreign affairs, Li Baodong (李保東), appeared on Monday to criticise both Pakistan and India over Azhar, the Jaish-e-Mohammed leader. “There should be no double standards on terrorism nor should one pursue its own political gains in the name of counter terrorism,” Li said in Beijing.

More proof of the diplomatic blow back facing Pakistan was provided by members of parliament tasked by the government to lobby politicians and think tanks in the West.

Rana Mohammed Afzal, a member of Sharif’s ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz party, complained that his efforts in France came to naught because of complaints about the activities of Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, founder of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a group responsible for the terror attack in Mumbai in 2008 that killed 166 people.

Pakistan and India should work on settling their differences behind closed doors

Saeed has been acquitted of involvement by Pakistan’s courts.

“The efficacy of our foreign policy speaks for itself when we couldn’t curtail Hafiz Saeed,” Afzal told a parliamentary committee on foreign affairs this month. “Which eggs is Hafiz Saeed laying for us that we are nurturing him?”

His remarks fed perceptions that the government and the military are at odds over action against the jihadist groups.

In its report, Dawn cited unnamed participants of the high-powered October 3 meeting as saying the foreign secretary’s advice on China’s reservations triggered an exchange of charges between the government and Pakistan’s powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency.

Pakistan bans journalist Cyril Almeida from leaving country over military rift report

The government denied the news report and ordered action against the writer, Dawn assistant editor Cyril Almeida, who was barred from leaving the country. “Puzzled, saddened. Had no intention of going anywhere; this is my home, Pakistan,” Almeida tweeted late Monday. The paper has stood by Almeida.

An Indian army vehicle near a building where suspected militants are thought to be hiding on the second day of a gunfight in Pampore, south of Srinagar, on October 11, 2016. Photo: AFP

Security analysts close to the military and the ISI, speaking on television, said proposals had been submitted to the government for decommissioning groups like Jaish and Lashkar. Preliminary measures would include the enforcement of existing legal bans, retired Lieutenant-General Amjad Shoaib said. The next phase would focus on the de-radicalisation of their members, and the final phase would see the recruitment of “able-bodied” former militants into Pakistani paramilitary units.

Sharif is expected to approve the plan at a meeting of the government’s national security committee, including the military leadership, on Tuesday.

Tom Hussain is an Islamabad-based journalist and Pakistan affairs analyst


India’s Friend For Ever

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Niggling issues apart, Russia most trustworthy

Fresh moves to tighten the India-Russia partnership indicate both nations’ resolve to work closely despite Moscow's occasional overtures to Pakistan. Russia's growing proximity to Beijing in recent years has created discomfort for Delhi. But being a traditional friend for decades, Russia's concern for India has always been strong. Pakistan's constant efforts to bring Russia and China together in its power corridor will not cause damage to India, as the latter figures prominently in the economic and strategic calculus of both these nations. On the sidelines of the ongoing Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (Brics) summit in Goa, India and Russia signed a slew of defense, energy, power, ship-building and space deals towards strengthening the bilateral ties.

The defense pacts that both the countries signed speak volumes since they come when India is at a crucial juncture of its fight against terror emerging from Pakistani soil. The four primary defense deals signed include: Developing a new version of the BrahMos missile, delivering Russia's most anti-missile defense systems called S-400 Triumf, a work-share agreement to make fifth generation fighter planes (FGFP) or perspective multi-role aircraft and finally, the production of Ka226T helicopters in India. The BrahMos deal will give India a miniature of the earlier ones already available in the country. This version will help India to reach out to the terror camps within a range of 300 kilometers. More importantly, it will have access to land, air, and water. This will probably give a new dimension to India's counter-terror efforts. The S-400 Triumf, which is Russia's most advanced air defence system, will help India restrict our hostile neighbours to operate within their air spaces.

The agreement pertaining to the FGFP will enable India to get access to Russian technology for producing 100 such aircraft in India. Russia-based Rostec State Corporation is expected to set up joint production facilities in India for the Ka226T helicopters. Both the nations agreed to hold an annual military industrial conference which will allow stakeholders on both sides to institute and push for possible collaborations and will open up numerous fresh opportunities. The key defence deals signed between India and Russia once again buttress the enhanced bilateral cooperation. They highlight the important role Russia plays in India's defence research, development and cooperation. Russian President Vladimir Putin called India a “privileged strategic partner”. This is indeed true, regardless of India's growing proximity to America.

Simultaneously, the growing bilateral cooperation in the field of energy means a lot for Indian public sector companies such as the Oil and Natural Gas Commission and the Indian Oil Corporation, which are already operating on a large scale in Russia. Besides, energy cooperation is something India is looking to tap on a large scale. Recognizing the continued importance of Russia in our economic and strategic future, Prime Minister Narendra Modi referred to that country as “an old friend”, being “better than two new friends”. Both India and Russia, despite hiccups, are committed to sustaining the strong bonds they have shared over the decades — and this is just as well.


'Bleed India With A Thousand Cuts' Policy Is In A Shambles

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by Pervez Hoodbhoy

As a new cold war sets in between India and Pakistan in the wake of India’s retaliatory strikes on terror camps across the LoC, two Pakistani commentators present the other side of the argument 

NO ONE SEES the Kashmir dispute having a solution in the foreseeable future. Everything has been tried: war, repression, elections, and inducements. Bad as the situation is now, the dreadful possibility is that it could spiral out of control. The decades of the 1980s and 1990s could return, and thousands of more Kashmiris could die. Infinitely worse, whether by choice or accident, is the possibility of nuclear catastrophe. Having cagily pranced around the nuclear threshold for three decades, for Pakistan and India to make the final journey to hell is not impossible.

These gloomy truths are undeniable. Fortunately, Uri was finally contained and appears to be winding down, just as Pathankot was earlier. But will the next crisis also be manageable? Realism demands calm thinking, letting passions subside and moving ahead. Rather than look for ultimate solutions now, the present needs to be managed and attitudes changed. But before that can happen, let India and Pakistan review their actions honestly.

It was a terrible mistake for India to eliminate 22-year-old Burhan Wani and the other Kashmiri lads. Surely, these were not the monsters that murdered dozens at Victoria Terminus in Mumbai and then scoured the rooms of the Taj looking for Hindus and Jews to shoot. They were not crazed religious extremists, nor on Pakistan’s payroll. Instead, these angry rebellious youth were drawn by romance and bravado into what they saw as a war against Indian occupation. They had a few guns, but their real weapons were Facebook images.

Unless India learns to intelligently manage Kashmiri anger, an action-reaction cycle could well take Kashmir back to the carnage that followed 1989. Set off by protests against the rigging of Kashmiri elections by far-off Delhi, India’s massive over-reaction had then sparked off an insurgency that lasted into the early 2000s and resulted in the deaths of nearly 90,000 civilians, militants, police personnel and soldiers.

Pakistan lost little time in hijacking what was then an indigenous uprising. The excesses committed by Indian security forces were soon eclipsed by those committed by Pakistan based mujaheddin. The massacres of Kashmiri Pandits, targeting of civilians accused of collaborating with India, killings of Kashmiri political leaders, destruction of cinema houses and liquor shops, forcing of women into the veil, and revival of Shia-Sunni disputes severely undermined the legitimacy of the Kashmiri freedom movement and deprived it of its most potent weapon—the moral high ground.

After Uri, India moved swiftly on the diplomatic front. A news scoop published in the Karachi-based daily Dawn on 6 October suggests that the country’s political establishment is deeply worried by Pakistan’s growing international isolation and has sharp differences with the country’s military establishment. Reportedly, at a closed meeting with military leaders, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had demanded that fresh attempts be made to conclude the Pathankot investigation, restart the stalled Mumbai attacks-related trials in a Rawalpindi anti-terrorism court, and prevent military- led intelligence agencies from interfering in law enforcement acts against banned militant groups. These decisions were taken in the background of ‘an extraordinary verbal confrontation between Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif and the ISI DG’.

The story has been thrice denied by Nawaz Sharif’s government, each time with greater vehemence. But Dawn’s editor stands by it: ‘The story that has been rejected by Prime Minister’s Office as a fabrication was verified, cross-checked and fact-checked.’ The very intensity of the denial, and the fact that the reporter is now barred from leaving Pakistan, suggests that there may be more than just a little truth to the story.

The emphatic repudiation is easily understood. Raw nerves have been touched at a time when the civilian government is insecure and General Raheel Sharif is enormously popular with the public. Whereas the army can portray itself as a defender of Pakistan’s territorial integrity, Nawaz Sharif is commonly depicted as the weakling who flew to Delhi for Narendra Modi’s inauguration and for many subsequent unofficial meetings.

One notes this is not the first time that such disputes have broken out into the open. Influential voices within the civil establishment are increasingly at odds over the military’s conduct of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Recently, a Pakistan Muslim League stalwart unknown for progressive views, Rana Muhammad Afzal, made local headlines when he addressed a meeting of the National Assembly Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and asked, “Hum Hafiz Saeed ko kyun paal rahe hain? Woh hamaare liye kaunse ande de raha hai?” (Why are we nurturing Hafiz Saeed? What eggs is he laying for us?).

Displaying classic opportunism, Pakistan’s liberal parliamentary opposition has laid the blame for the country’s growing international isolation on the government instead of the military. In a joint session of Parliament, Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) lawmakers chose to egg on the government to a more muscular response against India, criticising what they said was the government’s inability to make a strong case for Pakistan on the international stage.

Surely, if India considers Kashmiris to be its citizens then it must treat them as such, not as traitors deserving bullets or to be punched with an iron fist

“The day Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif says the name of Kulbushan Jadhav, I will donate Rs 50,000 to the blind association,” said Senator Aitzaz Ahsan, one of Pakistan’s most celebrated liberals. He was referring to Sharif’s United Nations General Assembly speech, where he failed to mention the Indian spy caught in Balochistan months earlier. 

PPP Senator Sherry Rehman, who runs the liberal Jinnah Institute in Islamabad, also slammed Pakistan’s foreign policy under Nawaz Sharif while praising the army’s war against terrorism. What she omitted to say is that the Foreign Office is little more than a post office. Or, if Pakistan were to appoint a foreign minister, that he would be little more than a postman. 

In India, as in Pakistan, personal and political agendas have allowed principles to go to the wind. Hence deeply dangerous rhetoric has come to dominate television screens. I have watched political talk shows in both countries and been struck by the quality of their belligerence and lack of reason. A paranoid style has come to dominate politics as anchors and guests compete for the highest levels of heated exaggeration, suspicion, and conspiratorial fantasy. 

When Rahul Gandhi accuses Narendra Modi of “khoon ki dalaali” and Bilawal Bhutto squeakily thunders “We will take back every inch of Kashmir”, it is clear that there is something dreadfully wrong. Lacking connection or empathy for the societies from which derivetheir extraordinary privilege, these princes of fortune seek to enhance their power by adding fuel to burning fires. Ditto for most of the subcontinents politicians. 

KASHMIR DOES NOT have any military solution. Decades of unremitting conflict proves this. Pakistan lacks the muscle to wrest Kashmir from Indian rule, and India cannot win decisively over Pakistan in the difficult, mountainous terrains. But India’s failure in Kashmir has not translated into success for Pakistan. As the late Eqbal Ahmad passionately argued, although India’s leaders bear much responsibility for Kashmir’s tragedy, Pakistan’s defective Kashmir policy had repeatedly ‘managed to rescue defeat from the jaws of victory’. 

Pakistan’s ‘bleed India with a thousand cuts’ policy—while denying that such a policy exists—is in shambles. India has sustained the losses, with no perceptible weakening of resolve or strength. Jihad has become an ugly word the world over China’s decision to stall a ban on Jaish-e Mohammed’s Masood Azhar by exercising a ‘technical hold’ at the UN somewhat muddies these waters, giving jihad proponents in Pakistan a faint hope that support exists somewhere. However, Chinese support is evanescent—China’s silence after Uri is deeply significant. 

The consequence of waging covert war has been steady loss of international support for Pakistan on its Kashmir policy. This is known to all Pakistani diplomats who represent Pakistan’s position in the world’s capitals, including those of Muslim countries. The moral high ground erodes ever more sharply after every jihadist attack. This led Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif to call the Uri attack an “inside job” designed by India to attract sympathy. It is unlikely that Asif was able to find any buyers outside of a narrow circle in Pakistan. 

The indigenisation of the Kashmir movement, increased difficulty of penetration through border fencing, and the grave domestic and international political costs of using proxies suggests a new path for Pakistan. It can make a virtue out of necessity by cracking down upon Kashmir oriented militant groups still operating from its soil. Such groups have turned out to be a menace to Pakistan’s society and armed forces, apart from taking legitimacy away from those fighting Indian rule. 

Resistance to such a change comes from many places—a possible backlash from the religious parties and extreme elements within the military, and a large standing army that needs an enemy. Not to be neglected is sheer intellectual laziness and a difficulty imagining what peace could be like. Inertia, default, and adhocism dominate planning and design. 

Pakistan cannot expect its international reputation to improve unless it explicitly renounces jihad as an instrument of foreign policy, and dismantles an infrastructure that is now three decades old. But does it care enough about that? As I have frequently argued, it does. With a reasonably high economic growth rate predicted for the forthcoming year, and with the China Pakistan Economic Corridor close to $47 billion dollars investment, it has much to lose. 

India has perhaps even more reason to want peace and stability. From a rational point of view, ratcheting up tensions with Pakistan makes even less sense. While Prime Minister Modi has finally stepped back from chest-thumping and irresponsible posturing on the Indian Army’s ‘surgical strikes’, much damage has been done.

India must understand that the key to cooling Kashmir is in its own possession, not in Pakistan’s. India stands morally isolated from Kashmiri Muslims and incurs the very considerable costs of an occupying power. Indian soldiers do not want to die in Kashmir—why should they? By formally acknowledging Kashmir as a problem that needs a solution, using humane methods of crowd control, and releasing political prisoners from Kashmiri jails, India could move sensibly towards a lessening of internal tensions.

Thoughtful Indians must ask why their country should care about peace in Kashmir. Surely, if India considers Kashmiris to be its citizens, then it must treat them as such, not as traitors deserving bullets or to be punched with an iron fist. Else it should hand Kashmir over to Kashmiris—or Pakistan. Indeed, its efforts to create a secular state and have religious harmony—and to become the third biggest economy in the world by 2050—could all come to naught if Pakistan and India relations boil over.

There is another danger, one that India could pay dearly for. The radicalization of Kashmiri youth is well under way. Propelled by India’s mishandling of civil dissent, Kashmiri identity is being rapidly displaced by an Islamic identity. Islamic slogans and calls for an Islamic state in Kashmir are being heard with ever greater vigor at anti-India demonstrations. Once released, fanatical zeal becomes impossible to control. It took a long time for Pakistan to understand this point. One can only hope that India will realize it before it is too late.

Pakistan and India cannot afford the next decade to look like previous ones. Their conflict is like a cancerous growth, a malignant organism growing unchecked. Hostile state-sponsored propaganda on both sides must end. The road to peace has narrowed but remains open.

Pervez Hoodbhoy, an academic based in Lahore and Islamabad, is a frequent commentator in the Pakistani media


Now Is the Time To Hit Pakistan With Sanctions

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by Shawn Snow

It is time to put a credible threat of sanctions on the table.

On October 7, Dawn, a Pakistani based newspaper, published an article detailing the anxiousness of the inner sanctum of Pakistan’s civilian controlled government. A debate is raging within Pakistan regarding the country’s tacit support of militant groups.

The article titled, “Act against militants or face international isolation, civilians tell military,” detailed plans articulated by the civilian government to military and defense bureaus of the need to act on banned militant groups operating in the country.

The decisive action ordered by Islamabad to combat insurgent groups operating in the country followed a high-level meeting chaired by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in which Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry presented to high ranking members of government that Pakistan’s diplomatic talking points were failing to sway the international community and that Pakistan faced potential international isolation.

As Afghanistan limps on from one its bloodiest fighting seasons that has witnessed almost 4,500 casualties from March to August, many fingers have pointed at Pakistan’s support of Taliban militants for much of the instability and discord ravaging the countryside.

Five of Afghanistan’s provincial capitals are under threat of collapse, and, on Tuesday, Afghan forces struggling to repel Taliban advances around Lashkar Gah were massacred while orchestrating a negotiated tactical retreat; reports indicate that 100 Afghan forces were killed in the ambush.

U.S. forces were rapidly deployed on Wednesday to assist Afghan security forces as they attempted to push back Taliban gains near the entrance of Farah city, the provincial capital of Farah.

Haroon Chakhansuri, a spokesman for President Ashraf Ghani, blamed Pakistan for much of violence in remarks to The New York Times, “We can see there is a lot of truth and evidence — in the examples of fighting in Uruzgan and Kunduz — that terrorist groups and their operations are led by foreigners and generals, and they are receiving military and financial support from outside Afghanistan,” he said. “The way this war is managed, it shows that this is done by experts. This is very clear.”

Over the last several months, the international community has stepped up efforts to pressure Islamabad into ending its support of militant groups. Highlighting its displeasure with Pakistan, the U.S. canceled sales of its F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan, and withheld $300 million dollars in U.S. assistance earmarked for allies combating terrorism around the globe.

Despite Washington’s signals to Islamabad, Pakistan has continued to bloody Kabul through proxy agents — namely the Haqqani Network, Pakistan’s” veritable arm,” and much of the international community sees Pakistan’s hallmark on the terrorist attack on the Indian military camp in Uri, Kashmir that killed 17 Indian soldiers in September.

Pakistan may be feeling the pressure with Tuesday’s arrest of three prominent Taliban leaders including Mullah Nanai who operated as Mullah Akhtar Mansour’s intelligence chief. Local sources have indicated that the arrests were a result of the Taliban’s refusal to enter peace talks with the Afghan government.

However, Afghan officials are skeptical of Pakistan’s sincerity on the crackdown; Dawa Khan Minapal, President Ashraf Ghani’s deputy spokesman stated, “Pakistani government has not informed the Afghan government over its claims of arresting several Taliban members; therefore, Kabul cannot verify the credibility of the report.”

Pakistan has in the past initiated high-level operations to flush out militants in an attempt to sway skeptical minds of its seriousness to combat jihadi groups in the country. In 2014, Pakistan launched a major military operation named Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan in an effort to combat militant groups hiding out in Pakistan’s frontier region. However, many analysts have indicated that Pakistan used the operation to protect groups that it deemed important to its strategic efforts, allowing many Taliban factions to flee the area.

The international community should not take Pakistan’s carrot at face value. The Global Competitiveness Report 2016-17 indicates that Pakistan is currently the least competitive economy in South Asia and ranked 122 out of 138 countries overall. The erosion of Pakistan’s industrial base and a reliance on imports has led to Pakistan’s poor competitiveness in the region.

Pakistan’s economic vulnerability has made it dependent on Chinese investments, chiefly the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as its only shimmering light in a bleak economic forecast.

If the United States and the international community want serious concessions from Pakistan, a credible threat of sanctions must be on the table. As the international community has begun to sour on Pakistan’s support of jihadi groups, the time is ripe to put sanctions on the table; it is time to hit Pakistan where it is most vulnerable.


Create National Counter-Terrorism Center To Fight Terror: Experts

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Another former home ministry officer, who did not want to be named, agreed that it would be pointless to "force" NCTC upon states in a diluted form. (Representative image)

by Bharti Jain

NEW DELHI: As the Modi government mulls revisiting UPA's proposal for a National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) to track and fight terror, experts feel the idea may be stillborn without a constitutional amendment to separate common 'law and order' duties from intra-state, transnational offences like terrorism and cyber crime, and bringing the latter under the Union or concurrent list.

"A national debate must be initiated with states so that the fundamental way in which they look at 'law and order', which as per the current constitutional scheme is their exclusive domain, undergoes a change. Chief ministers, who have been opposing NCTC, saying its powers to arrest and search suspects anywhere in the country would encroach upon their turf, must be convinced that while their powers to handle crimes like robbery, assault, rape and traffic rule violations would be untouched, more critical offences like terrorism and cyber crimes — which have intra-state and international linkages — cannot be handled by the state police alone," former home secretary G K Pillai told TOI.

Pillai said a protracted debate, which may well span over 3-5 years, need to be undertaken by creating a council of home ministers of various states, just as it was done in the case of goods and services tax. "The chief ministers must appreciate that the state police is not competent to track and counter transnational threats and crimes like terrorism and cyber offences, and that a central agency is needed for the purpose. To empower this central agency (NCTC) to effectively deal with terrorism and cyber crimes, the Constitution must be amended first to bring these offences in the concurrent list," he said.

Another former home ministry officer, who did not want to be named, agreed that it would be pointless to "force" NCTC upon states in a diluted form. "The NCTC cannot be created with truncated powers. The solution really lies in amending the Constitution to bring terrorism and insurgency in the Union list. NCTC should not only be an intelligence-gathering and operational body but also have powers to probe crimes related to terror and insurgency. NIA should ideally be merged with NCTC to avoid any turf war," said the former IPS officer who has served in the internal security division of the home ministry.



Technology And Gap Closure Used To Seal Border In Kachchh: Manohar Parikkar

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Defence Minister Manohar Parikkar on Monday spoke on the challenging task of border maintenance along India-Pakistan border in Kachchh region of Gujarat and said that they are attempting to inhibit unauthorized entry through technology and closing of gaps.

"The Border Security Force is being tightened and the gaps are being filled as this is a very difficult border. There are many areas where you cannot put a fence, since it's swampy and marshy area. But with the help of technology and by closing the gaps, we are attempting that no unauthorized can enter the country," Parikkar said.

Indian security forces along the entire length of the border with Pakistan have been put on high alert following the Uri terror attack. But only about half the border that Gujarat shares with Pakistan has been fenced.

The marshy terrain in Kachchh poses challenges to building and maintaining a border fence. Fencing along the India-Pakistan border in Kachchh has been approved for only 340 km of the border in Gujarat. It has not even been approved for about 200 km of the 512 km of the border in Gujarat.

The actual building of the fence has been completed only on 262 km. This means just half the entire length of the border with Pakistan is fenced.

The Centre government has since the 1990s undertaken the task of constructing a border fence to prevent easy crossing into India. Fencing has been completed in sensitive regions like Punjab, which has seen two major attacks by terrorists from Pakistan since 2015.

The International Border that runs from the Jammu region of Jammu and Kashmir to the watery wastelands of Kachchh does not see as much infiltration activity as compared to the Line of Control in Kashmir.

But the border has seen infiltration by drug traffickers or terrorists, like the ones who attacked Dinanagar and Pathankot, both in Punjab.


BRICS Summit: China Bulldozed India's Security Concerns As Russia Looked The Other Way

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by Sachin Parashar

China blocked India's attempts to include the names of terror groups like JeM and LeT in the Brics' Goa Declaration but what has hurt the government more is Russia's disinclination to argue India's case. The result was a declaration which failed to address India's core concern of state-sponsored terrorism.

Russia did not help India name-check JeM and LeT in the Brics' Goa Declaration
But it ensured that Syria-based Jabhat al-Nusra figured in the list
Strategic experts said India could do little while China managed to get its own way, even at India's expense

BENAULIM (GOA): China blocked India's attempts to include the names of terror groups like JeM and LeT in the BRICS' Goa Declaration but what has hurt the government more, as sources said, is Russia's disinclination to argue India's case. The result, of course, was a declaration which failed to address India's core concern of the issue of state-sponsored terrorism. 

What compounded the matter for India was Russia's recent military flirtation with Pakistan in the name of anti-terror exercise. In the current global power play, Russia is seen increasingly as needing China more than the other way round, but Moscow's submission to the Chinese position on an issue related to India's security still has come as a revelation to the Indian authorities.

While Russia did not help India name-check JeM, which perpetrated both Pathankot and Uri attacks, in the Goa Declaration, it ensured that Syria-based Jabhat al-Nusra figured in it. As it seeks to bolster the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, Russia has continued to target al-Nusra, which it accuses of seeking a Caliphate through barbaric methods, in the country. Like the Nusra, JeM and LeT too are proscribed by the UN. Russia called for "relentless pursuit'' of al-Nusra in the declaration.

As strategic affairs expert Brahma Chellaney said, Moscow appeared willing to accommodate India's concerns in the Goa Declaration but, in the face of Chinese opposition, shied away from supporting India's case.

"The result was that the declaration failed to mention the most potent form of terrorism in the world, which is state-sponsored. And while citing groups like ISIS and al-Nusra, the declaration conveniently omitted any mention of the Pakistan-based organizations that the UN has designated as terrorist entities," he said, adding that the "anodyne" declaration called into question the utility of BRICS for India.

With Russia doing precious little for India, China could shield Pakistani terrorism not only at the UN Security Council but also at a multilateral summit on Indian soil. In doing so, as Chellaney said, China rode roughshod over Indian concerns and showed itself culpably in the killing of 26 Indian soldiers at Uri and Pathankot. 

While Russia itself has been the clear winner in terms of BRICS' focus on security related issues, China continues to call the shots on financial issues, leading to questions about the utility of Brics for India.

"China uses BRICS to advance its economic and political interests, including dominating the two financial mechanisms that the grouping has set up. But what does India get from BRICS?" said Chellaney.

"Goa showed that while China manages to get its own way, even at India's expense, Indian officials do little other than put on a brave face. Even earlier, when China secured the right instead of India to host the Brics' New Development Bank, Indian officials were left flaunting a consolation prize -- an Indian to be the Bank's first president," he added.

The Goa Declaration came just a day after President Vladimir Putin assured PM Narendra Modi in their summit meeting that Russia would do nothing to hurt India's interests. As MEA secretary Amar Sinha admitted, there was no consensus on naming Pakistan-based terror groups because other countries are not affected by their actions.

Moscow also had its full say on Syria as the declaration called upon all parties involved to work for a comprehensive and peaceful resolution of the conflict taking into account the legitimate aspirations of the people of Syria, through inclusive national dialogue and a Syrian-led political process.

"While continuing the relentless pursuit against terrorist groups so designated by the UN Security Council, including ISIL, Jabhat al-Nusra, and other terrorist organizations designated by the UN Security Council,'' said the declaration.


What Uri Says About India’s Grand Strategy

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by Shaheli Das

During the 1990s, eminent strategic analysts such as George K. Tanham and K. Subramanyam argued that, particularly due to its aversion to power, India lacked a grand strategy. Grand strategy here refers to a nation’s strategy of deploying its political, economic, diplomatic, and military tools to accomplish its national interest. The recent Uri attack has once again raised the question: does India have a grand strategy?

At present, the essence of India’s grand strategy is to augment its national security by curtailing security competition. The underlying objectives of India’s grand strategy are essential to establish itself as an important player internationally and to pursue sustained economic growth. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the vision of India’s grand strategy has transcended into a concrete operating model. First, there has been a visible shift in India’s national strategy from a traditional reliance on the policy of non-alignment to one of pro-active engagement with the outside world. And second, India under Modi seems to be utilizing hard power to get desired outcomes.

Political Engagement as Grand Strategy

Prime Minister Modi has emphasized forging diplomatic and political relations with neighboring countries in South Asia as well as shoring up ties with major powers such as the United States, China, and Russia. During his tenure, Modi has carefully crafted India’s national strategy through the tactic of neighborhood diplomacy. It began in 2014 when Modi invited the leaders of all the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) nations to his oath-taking ceremony. Modi’s decision to go to Bhutan for his first foreign visit after assuming office was also an indication of the importance of regional ties for India.

The Prime Minister has also made a concerted effort to strengthen ties with major powers outside of its own neighborhood. The historic invitation extended to President Barack Obama to attend the 66th Indian Republic Day celebrations as the guest of honor served to challenge China’s growing bonhomie with Pakistan by projecting an interest in shoring up ties with the United States – in other words, playing the balance of power card. Modi has also advanced India’s Act East policy, thereby bolstering diplomatic relations with Japan, Vietnam, and Australia in order to counter China’s rising influence in Southeast Asia. Of late, India has made its presence felt globally through proactive participation in multilateral platforms and groupings such as the Brazil Russia India China South Africa (BRICS) summit, Group of 20, SAARC, Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), and the India Brazil South Africa (IBSA) forum.

Having embarked upon 54 foreign trips as of October 2016, Modi has been criticized by the opposition parties, the public, and the media for undertaking numerous overseas trips during his two-year tenure in office. However, these critics have been silenced by the support that India earned from regional and international actors after the Uri attack.

Hard Power

In the past, India shied away from taking a decisive stand against its adversaries for a number of reasons. First, the Indian desire to isolate Pakistan seemed unrealistic, as Pakistan had much closer ties with major international actors such as the United States and China. Also, previous Indian governments did not invest as much in fostering strong strategic and economic ties with their South Asian neighbors. Second, given the longstanding and deep strategic relationship between Beijing and Islamabad, China has traditionally restricted a coherent response vis-a-vis Pakistan.

The assertive Indian response to the Uri attack demonstrates that Modi’s foreign policy has significantly diverged from his predecessors. Modi’s strategy is rooted in the Doval Doctrine which canvasses the use of an offensive-defensive approach. In line with this approach, India adopted several lines of attack to counter and diplomatically isolate Pakistan following the Uri attack, namely conducting surgical strikes on terror launch pads across the Line of Control, pulling out of the 19th SAARC Summit to be held in Islamabad, playing the Indus Waters Treaty card, referring to Pakistan as the “Ivy League of terrorism” at the United Nations, announcing its intention to reconsider Pakistan’s Most Favored Nation status, and the proposal to carry out a towering naval exercise in the Arabian Sea, which is Pakistan’s only sea-based trade route.

Such activities are a clear demonstration of India’s hard power – a paradigm shift from the previous Indian foreign policy stance. China and Pakistan have remained India’s key adversaries, with Pakistan continuously being used by China as a bargaining chip against India. However, the way in which these adversaries have been dealt with has transformed under Modi’s leadership. There’s the sense that weak responses in the past led to recurrent attacks such as the Parliament attack in 2001, the Mumbai attacks in 2008, the Pathankot attack in January 2016, and most recently, the Uri attack in September 2016.

Conclusion

Preserving the country’s national security at the moment necessitates some amount of muscle-flexing. It is here that the Modi government has clearly differed from its predecessors. Although Indian grand strategy is yet to be fully articulated, this recent projection of an assertive attitude is largely an attempt to restore India’s credibility in the region and on the international stage. It is an indicator to neighbors China and Pakistan that India is prepared for any contingency.


Bilawal Bhutto Rattled With Modi's 'Pakistan A Mothership of Terror' Remark, Calls Indian PM 'BUTCHER'

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Karachi: Calling him a "butcher" of Gujarat and Kashmir, Pakistan Peoples Party chairman Bilawal Bhutto Zardari has said Prime Minister Narendra Modi was blaming Pakistan only to divert attention from "atrocities" being committed in the Valley.

Speaking at a rally in Karsaz here yesterday, Bhutto said Modi is an "extremist". "I have said that Modi is an extremist and there should be no hopes attached to him," Bhutto said.

He said Modi was blaming Pakistan only to divert attention from "atrocities" being committed in Kashmir.

He called Modi the "butcher of Gujarat and Kashmir", 'Geo news' reported. Highlighting the "plight" of Kashmiris, Bhutto, 28, said the people of the Valley were struggling for their "right to self-determination."

Bhutto also put forth four demands, threatening that he would announce a long march on December 27 that if they were not fulfilled.

The demands include the formation of a parliamentary committee on national security, passage of his party's bill on Panama Papers, implementation on former President Asif Zardari's resolution on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the immediate appointment of a foreign minister.

Bhutto also took a dig at Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's policies, saying they were the reason Pakistan had been weakened.

"Mian sahib you have failed in implementing the National Action Plan...We will change Pakistan if the public supports us," he said.

In his address at the BRICS summit yesterday, Modi called Pakistan a "mothership" of terrorism world-wide which shelters not just terrorists but nurtures a mindset that proclaimed that terrorism was justified for political gains.

"In our own region, terrorism poses a grave threat to peace, security, and development. Tragically its mothership is a country in India's neighborhood. Terror modules around the world are linked to this mothership," he had said, attacking Pakistan for supporting cross-border terrorism.


Pakistan Isolated Due To Its Own Policies, India Has No Role, Says MEA

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India did not have to play any role in isolation Pakistan is facing: Swarup

Constructive dialogue in terror-tainted atmosphere not possible: Swarup

SAARC summit postponed after India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Afghanistan & Sri Lanka pulled out.

Pakistan has been isolated because of its own policies and India did not have to play any role in it, official spokesperson of Ministry of External Affairs Vikas Swarup said today.

Pakistan faced a boycott by SAARC member countries after repeated instances of ceasefire violations and terror attacks post Uri attack.

"TERROR-TAINTED ATMOSPHERE" 

Vikas Swarup highlighted that Pakistan lacks the requisite conditions for a constructive dialogue, also cited by countries who pulled out of the SAARC summit scheduled for November this year in Islamabad.

"We do not speak about such issues. If someone is isolated, it is because of the policies followed by that country. India did not have to do anything because the countries in one voice said there cannot be constructive dialogue in the terror-tainted atmosphere in the context of SAARC," Swarup said.

"SAARC COUNTRIES SPOKE IN ONE VOICE"

Responding to a question on whether India has successfully isolated Pakistan after the Uri attacks, Swarup said "... the first letter (on non-participation in SAARC summit) came from Afghanistan, followed by Nepal, then by India, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka. Nepal also said it on its own. So when all SAARC countries express the same opinion in one voice -- that the SAARC summit cannot happen in Islamabad in this atmosphere -- you can draw your own conclusions."


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